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CHAPTER 1

On the Otherness
That Theory Creates
KLAUS KRIPPENDORFF

INTRODUCTION
The urge to theorize has been a driving force of Western intellectual tradition. It underlies academic discourse, giving the scientific enterprise its
vitality. Without systematic theorizing llluch of contemporary culture, particularly technology, would be virtually unthinkable.
Naturally, theorizing has not been -without critics. The skeptics have raised
their voices against the ability of theory to describe anything at all. Radical
empiricists, such as Francis Bacon, and even some logical positivists, have
had stories to tell of the "blindness of abstraction," Now, postrnodernists,
poststructuralists, constructionists, deconstructionists, and many others, are
questioning the intelligibility of master narratives and querying the ability
of unifYing theories or logical/mathematical systems to represent reality.
From their perspective, science, literature, and law are just three of many
literary genres, each cultivating its own reading of texts.
The most reccnt critique comes from feminist scholars. Although feminism is not a unified perspective, feminist thought has grown far beyond its
early advocacy of equal rights, be it by conceptualizing patriarchal society,
exploring gender differences, or even contributing scathing critiques of male
rationality, of technological world constructions, and of the oppressive consequences of theory. Along its path, feminism has emphasized the emboclied
nature of knowledge, for example, by accounting for voices instead of texts.
Feminism has also advocated relational epistemologies, insisted on the participation of emotions, and discovered validation in practical actions that
could lead to personalliberatioll.
Narrower in scope, but no less important, is the opposition to theory by
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philosophers concerned with ethics. Dwight Furrow (1995), for instance,
influenced by a rereading of Aristotle, questions the capacity of normative
ethical theory to provide guidance on normative questions and challenges
its relevance to the lived experience of moral agents. Such critiques are fueled by a need to understand the Holocaust, and other atrocities committed
since World War II, by people with theories to live by.
Within liter;uy scholarship, writers continue to reexamine their own foundations by questioning the intelligibility of texts in terms of the theorydriven distinction between meanings and an author's intentions, To them
there is nothing in a text that could point to the difference between the two
and no method that could shed light on what this distinction creates. For
Knapp and Michaels (1985: 30): "[theory] is the name for all the ways
people have tried to stand outside [the] practice [of reading and interpretation 1in order to govern [that] practice from without .... [N]o one can
reach [such] a position." This leads thein to propose that "the theoretical
enterprise should therefore come to an end."
The foregoing critiques have very different histories and little in common
with each other except for their opposition to systematic theorizing. Often
they even oppose each other. For example, feminists have been criticized
for essentializing the very gender differences that they oppose; and proponents of postmodernism, for being silent on moral questions that undermine
the intelligibility of moral experiences.
Many of these critiques rely on what I would call deficiency arguments-a
rhetorical strategy that seeks to show the failure of a theOlY by pointing to
what it blatantly omits or to what it surreptitiously distorts without recognizing that such critiques are based on another theory-usually one closer
to these critics' heart and therefore more "real" to them. Critiques of ideology, Marxists, for example, excel in this. They argue against theories of
knowledge from a perspective that is assumed to be "free" of ideological
biases, more encompassing in scope, capturing a broader territOlY, or offering a greater number of distinctions. Yet, using one theory to criticize another remains entirely within the practice of theorizing and cannot therefore
reveal the blind spots of theorizing. Worse, unable to recognize these blind
spots malees theorists blind to their own blindness.
The following examines the social role of theory and the particular relation that theorizing entails between theorists and the theorized others who
are the natural focus of social scientific inquiries.

SOME ENTAILMENTS OF THEORIZING
Etymologically, theory comes from the Greek theoria, the meaning of
which comprises not only the process of "looking at," "viewing," "contemplating," or "speculating," but also the VClY object perceived, "a sight," "a
tableau," or "a spectacle." These meanings imply a distinct attitude vis-a-
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vis what is theorized. Spectacles are created to be seen and discussed, not
to be altered. Spectacles are in front of the viewer"s eye. In such accounts
of theorizing, the use of ocular metaphors entails a tacit preference for sight
over sound, touch, and feelings, and it assigns secondary importance to
voices, stories, oral traditions, and practical knowledge. It is no accident that
we speak of scientific "observers," not of scientific listeners. There is no
auditory or tactile analogue to "observation," and, although reading and
writing would be difficult without sight, we tend to exclude them when we
speak of observing things.
As spectators, theorists observe but do not allow themselves to enter their
domain of .observation. Consequently, theorists endow £'1Ct8, naively conceptualized as residing outside of us, with the power to determine which theories are valid. It is the belief in this ontology, and nothing but that, which
ultimately justifies claims of being able to theorize facts for what they are,
without preconceptions and without accotmtability to those who may be
affected by these theories.
Since the seventeenth centmy, science has become increasingly "successful" in disconnecting theOlY from facts and observation from practice, notwithstanding that etymology links "fact" to manufacture. Perhaps with the
exception of hermeneutics and constructivism, all scientific methods somehow operationalize the derivation of theories from observational data. Aside
from the rare admission that data depend on theory, I know of no formalization of this reverse dependency or of any interactions between the two
(see Woolgar, 1993: 36, 53-66).
Ethnographic analyses of scientific practices reveal the cherished unidirectionality in proceeding from observations to theories to be a myth (see
Garfinlde, 1967; Garfinlde, Lynch, and Livingstone, 1982). But overcoming
this uni-directional conception would seem quite ll11possible as long as theories are stated in terms of an extensional logic, such as the logic of propositions, or modeled by computers, which are sequential n1achines that embody
the very same logic. To preserve this uni-directionality of scientific discourse
against the threat of vicious paradoxes, Bertrand Russell invented his famous
TheOlY of Logical Types, which has the effect of outlawing self-reference.
It is this restricted notion of logic and of language that places scientific
observers at the top of logical hierarchies, that thereby conceptualizes description top-downwards, that thus leads theorists to believe they could observe their lPorld without being observed by the objects of their observation.
The ocular metaphor is so prevalent within the scientific community that
theorists are encouraged to keep their distance not just to the observed but
to their theories as well. A case in point is the velY distinction between
theories and beliefs. In scientific texts, theories appear as more or less confirmed hypotheses-each having a calculable probability, however small, of
being invalid. Not so for beliefs: When we theorize, we theorize about something; but when we believe, we believe in something. In beliefs, the emo-
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tional detachment that theorists claim to have vis-a.-vis their theories is
erased in favor of the virtual certainty that things are the way they are seen
and spoken of In the words of Stanley Fish (1985: 116),
[A] theory is a special achievement of consciousness; a beliefis a prerequisite of being
conscious at alL Beliefs are not what you think about but what you think 1vith ... it
is within the space provided by their articulations that mental activity~induding the
activity of theorizing-goes on. Theories are something you can have-you can wield
them and hold them at a distance; belief.<; have you, in the sense that there can be no
distance between them and the acts they enable. (emphasis added)

The truths of theories may be pondered, but the truths of beliefs are held.
Contrary to popular conceptions of theories as accurate representations,
theories are attractive because they exceed their domain of observation in
at least five ways: (1) Theories generalize to cases claimed to be similar to
those observed. Yet, without fhrther observations, no assurance is available
that the unobserved cases would support a theory's cIailn. Therefore, generalizations rely on a good deal of belief. (2) Theories predict under the
assumption that the patterns observed in the past will persist into the future.
Belief in such continuities have much practical value, but, as Francis Bacon
already noted, they are ascertainable only in retrospect. (3) Theories integrate several propositions into a single coherent network, and (4) they generate empirical hypotheses from a very small number of quasi-axiomatic
propositions. Note that (3) and (4) are predicated on the belief that the
logic of propositions truly corresponds to the logic of the world. According
to Carl Hempel (Mitchell, 1985: 7), (5) theory tends to be taken as "a
complex spatial network [that1 floats, as it were, above the plane of observation and is anchored to it by rules of interpretation." Yet rules of interpretation always are the rules of a theorist or of a community of theorists,
not of an observed nature. They allow theorists to justifY omitting details
deemed irrelevant, accidental, unique, inconsistent, or subjective; filling in
of the gaps of missed observations; or smoothing the rugged curves-none
of which is derivable from observation and measurement.
Politically, the more territory a theory covers, the more it is preferred, the
better it will be remembered, and the more likely it will be applied. Thus,
theorizing supports a conceptual imperialism; the urge to oversee, predict,
control, and govern ever-growing territories (Krippendorff, 1993)-an inlcling that science shares with other forms of government in national, spiritual,
or commercial spheres of life. Tnle, theories by themselves neither reign nor
rule. Once institutionalized, however, they do encourage their users to "survey," "capture," "represent," "monitor," and ultimately "manage," where
they do not even "discipline" what they claim to describe. The lmderlying
logic of propositions, especially its Theory of Logical Types, encourages the
construction of logical hierarchies of ever-increasing levels of abstractions,
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from objects to language, to meta-language, to meta-meta-Ianguagc, and so
forth, with theorists finding comfort only at the top.
Foucault's (1977) famous metaphorical use of the panopticon to give an
account of how knowledge works in society is telling. The panopticon is an
ideal prison design that enables centrally located guards to monitor the behavior of all inmates, who in turn can see only the guards observing them
but not each other. Here discipline is assured by the efficiency of observation. In taking this design as a metaphor to explore power relations in society, Foucault equates lmowledge and theory and canies the built-in
ocularity to its ultimate sociological conclusion: government of one view at
the expense of all others.
Theories are also expected to be rational and consistent, ideally in the
form of mathematical expressions, as systems of equations, for example. Formalizations of this kind have the double advantage of being computable in
principle and of sparing one the complications of context and meaning.
Mathematical theories provide the backbone of the natural sciences but have
made inroads also in efforts to explain social phenOlnena, in economics,
linguistics, psychology, and systems science, for instance. While rationality
and consistency are considered twin values of scientific explorations, they
are also two different aspects of the monologism that theOlY implies. Being
"rational" is tantamount to spealcing in the voice of one's community, a
voice that is assumed common to all of its members and sanctioned as such.
Rationality defers one's own voice to a fictional authority. Being "consistent," on the other hand, is tantamolmt to avoiding contradictions among
the propositions of a theOlY. Consistency entails the belief that a single
overarching logic could govern the phenomena that a theory claims to be
about. The requirement that theories be both rational and consistent thus
reduces them to monological constructions in the dual sense of being the
product of a single voice and of being cast in terms of one (cohennt) logic.
This has considerable implications for social theorizing.

THE LANGUAGING OF THEORIES
Consider the following rather typical propositions, which could be found
in any social science writing:
(a) Institutions have four functions.

(b) Nationalism is an outgrowth of modernism.
(c) Terrorism is caused by a brealldmvn in political st1'uctures.

(d) Unemployment feeds crime.

In the context of the foregoing, these four propositions should be troublesome: None of them indicates whose truths they state, attesting to their
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complete disembodiment. All hide the fact that they are fundamentally
about what people do. Institutions, nationalism, terrorism, unemployment
and crime do not exist without their performers. Yet, their voices are silenced in each of these generalizations. There is no indication of how their
behaviors end up being so categorized. Even the voice of the theorist remains hidden, perhaps deliberately, behind an objectivist language.
Language is implicated here in even more fundamental ways, however.
Of the four propositions: (a) asserts that a concept "has" or is "in possession
of" properties, which lends an almost physical existence to this concept, to
iustitutions as it were. (b) applies an agricultural metaphor to two rather
high~levcl abstractions from a complex nexus of human behaviors without
referriug to any particular group of people or locale; but metaphors reside
in language, not in nature. (c) claims hvo abstractions-a category of human
behavior and a stable pattern abstracted from a process-to be causally related. But how could that be? Next, (d) accounts for what probably is a
statistical correlation in terms of nutrition between two variables, of which
one is an agent and the other its target. A casual reading of these propositions gives the impression that they state facts. However, such a reading
overlooks theu' Inetaphorical nature. How could concepts cause anything
analogous to how billiard balls bounce against each other? And measurement variables "act," let alone interact? In what sense could non-material
structures break? The failure to recognize the metaphorical nature of language, even in the most rigorous scientific discourses, attests to a remarkable
unawareness of how language directs the world we theorize.
Clearly, theories are formed in language, but they also must be languaged
into being and be fit to survive in processes of human communication. In
the context of their communication, the notion of theory suffers from two
illusions:
1. The first stems from the belief that the form of theory could be separated from what language makes available and that, by the same token,
human communication has no influence on how and where theories COlne
into beulg. Theories are not merely fOlmd. They are constructed, proposed,
promoted, published, discussed, and either adopted or rejected. Their reality
lies in stating thenl, in understanding theln as such, and in enacting them
iuto actual practices (see Chapters 2, 7, 9, and 11 in this volume). These
are the acts of real people, actors who see some virtue Ul promulgating what
they speale of It follows that theoriziug cannot be understood from a notion
of language as a neutral medium of representation (as a formalization in
pure propositional logic ) or from the corollary that theories can be justifiable
by observations (of objects outside language) only. The notion of languaging as a dialogical process permits us to recognize theories as mediating
between their stakeholders and residing as such in processes of COlllillunication (see Chapters 3, 6, and 10). From this perspective, theories cannot
be found in the contents of statements or ulside individual minds; rather,
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they are discovered in processes of their continuous rcarticulations. Theories
that fail to C0111pel people to reproduce, to recirculate them -within their
community, simply fade away.
& communications, theories serve a variety of social functions. They can
define a theorist's identity. They can form the basis of particular research
programs or schools of thought. They can become institutionalized in disciplines that require adherence to or belief in them from its practitioners.
Linguists, psychologists, biologists, indeed all academic disciplines, distinguish themselves by the theories they believe in. Sometimes theories take
the form of abstract paradigms that privilege particular scientiiic explorations. At other times, they certifY practitioners and protect thClll against
criticisms fi'om other disciplines. In either case, theories are political phenomena.
2. The second illusion arises from the conviction that social theories have
invariant and single meanings. But unlike natural scientific theories, social
theories, once published, can reenter and touch the lives of the very people
about whom they speak (Krippendorff, 1996). When such a reenny occurs,
theories and those theorized in them begin to interact and modify each
other in ways that violate the idea of theory as a descriptive accolmt of stable
facts, as a representation of an unintelligent world. Those who discover
themselves to be theorized might use the publicity in ways to enhance their
status. They can also see it as a threat to their identity. When known, a
theory can thus affect the behavior of the theorized in ways that can
strengthen or invalidate it. At the time, Black Power and feminist movements effectively countered prevailing theories about them by circulating
theories of their own. Theories may also be adopted by people who find
new meanings in living through their propositions, by enacting their stereotypes, preserving their distinctions-thus maldng a theory n-uer simply
through its practice.
The mass Inedia, by catering to audiences conceptualized in terms of size
and attractiveness, "mainstream" the public. They cause more people to
become similar to each other, thereby also enhancing their attractiveness to
advertisers. Taking theories, especially predictive ones, as prescriptions for
action can turn them into self-fltlfilling prophecies. In social reality, which
depends on the knowledge people have of it, this is the norm, not the
exception.
Thus, theories of social phenomena do not simply represent but, rather,
also transform their objects in the process of their communication. Positivists
have reasons to worry that the reentry of theories into their domain of
observation could undermine the validity of those theories. This is why they
take considerable methodological precautions to protect their ontology from
such challenges.
If theorizing is, indeed, a political process and if the dissemination of
social theories does change their validity, one might think that political sci-
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ence would have luuch to say about the politics of theorizing; that the
theories created in the social sciences would, at least, account for their own
social consequences. This, however, seems not to be the casco Inspired by the
successes of the natural sciences and convinced that the social sciences, too,
could discover and accumulate a body of theories, social theorists have effectively succeeded in making social theory "unsocial," political theory "apolitical," and so forth. The widespread practice of theorizing the social
conceals its communicative and political nature. Theorizing the social seems
to work only where theorists) the institutions using their theories, and the the-

orized others collude-in holding the theorized reality constant, while collectively denying that alone or together anyone of them had anything to do with
it.
This grand self-deception correlates well wirh rhe myth rhat rheorists
could stay outside of the language they use to explain the world-a world
portrayed as if inhabited by people devoid of any linguistic intelligence of
their own, if only because the theorists themselves take a "God's eye view"
(Putnam, 1981) of the universe rlley try to explain.
Scholars daring to question such monological views can be seriously sanctioned. This has happened to several philosophers of science-Popper, Lakatos, and Kuhn, for instance~among whom the late Paul Feyerabend was
to be singled out by phycisists as "The Worst Enemy of Science" (Horgan,
1993).
It would seem that the foregoing offers us a choice. We can continue
practicing natural science methods of theorizing our domain of observation,
hiding ourselves behind an objectivist langnage, and losing touch with rhe
social world we unwittingly transform. Or we can deliberately and responsibly involve ourselves in the very politics that our inquiries set in motion.
To underscore the urgency of this choice, let me explore how fellow humans
fare in the theories of social science about them.

THEORIZING THE OTHER
1. Theorizing gives birth to distant otherness. As ideated generalizations,
theories classify observations and theorize people in terms of third-person
plural. "They" are the subjects of experiments, the interviewees of surveys,
and the respondents to mail questionnaires. ((They" also are the conservatives, the tmemployed, the Catholics, and the terrorists. All of "them" are
neatly labeled and assigned to particular classes on account of characteristics
that all members of such classes are assumed to share. Classification already
begins at the data-generating stage of social research. In interviewing, for
example, neither the identity of the interviewee nor that of the interviewer
becomes data. For fear of biasing the data, personal knowledge, which could
emerge when experimenters come too close to their subjects, is systematically repressed.
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In the theater, spectators have no problem in distinguishing between actors and the characters they impersonate on stage. But in social research,
inruviduals are the very categories that a theory provides for. Where inruviduals identifY with a group, belief, or trait, theorists are not prohibited from
dismissing such declarations as subjective, as lacking abstraction, or as irrelevant to their theory. And when quoted, individual voices are taken to exemplity the voice of a class. This is accomplished by channeling a plurality
of voices into a single, artificially constructed voice~one for each class, one
for each categolY, of the theorist's choosing. But classes never speak; individuals do, usually always to others, even when they are virtual in nature.
In the reality of everyday life, collective monologues, choruses, for example,
are extremely rarc, To take such exceptions as a norm for social scientific
insights attests to the artificial and llilsocial nature of theorizing.
In everyday languaging, third-person pronouns refer to those absent. Theorizing mal(es this absence a seeming virtue that gives theorists the freedom
to characterize others in ways radically different and inferior to themselves.
Whether one calls this a professional disability (a deafness to individual
voices or an institutionalized disrespect for otherness), theorizing is responsible for estranging others from us.
2. Theorizing trivializes others by reducing them to obedient mechanisms.
As spectators, social theorists observe human behaviors, including verbal
interactions, from outside the spectacle. FrOIU this perspective, behaviors
appear as linear sequences, temporally ordered chains of events, or trajectories in a Cartesian space within predefined coordinates. To understand the
trajectOlies, natural scientists would seek to discover their regularities. However, the velY mention of "regularities" aSSUlnes that trajectories are followed without much choice in the matter. And talk of their "discovery"
tends to suggest that they existed prior to their observation and meaSUl'ement. Such assumptions are not only built into mathematical theories of
behavior, but also inscribed into computational techniques for analyzing
behavioral data. They can also enter less formalized conversations on social
causation. For eXalnple, plays are usually scripted; and scripts explain much
of what theater audiences end up seeing. But for the strict determinacy of
machines, scripts are to performances much as computer programs are to
computations. They are in control of the plot. Describing human behavior
in terms of scripts, rules, and grammars, or even as being reactive to messages, conjures the determinism of obedient meChalllSms. Since spectators
can never be sure whether, when, and to what extent an observed behavior
is an act or a response-minutely scripted or improvised-to unobserved
conditions, deterministic accounts have no observational basis. They are the
fruit of preferences-unless theorists step out of their observer's role and
ask pertinent questions. However, even the Turing Test, designed to distingtush machine from human intelligence, is never quite conclusive. Its use
has taught us that interaction is a necessary but not a sufficient condition
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to determine the presence of human intelligence or agency. Commonly,
theorists cannot afford this' interaction~because it would shift the authority
for theorizing to the subjects being observed and thus erode the theorist's
objective observer status. Hence, theorizing remains stuck in causal and
mechanistic explanations of human behavior, from which that of the theorists is excluded.
Without even engaging theorized others in conversations 011 the theories
being developed about them, social theorists remain remarkably free to explore any theory that would be of interest to their own community. Although novel conceptualizations may not come easy, fro111 the convenient
position of an outside observer it is all right for sociologists like Goffman
(1959, 1963) to describe social interactions in dramaturgical categories; for
psychologists like Schank and Abelson (1977) to interpret the same behavior
in terms of individuals following rules and scripts; for literary scholars like
Hirsch (1967) to extract intentions from an author's writings; for cognitive
scientists to develop algorithms that are presumed to govern individual actors' processing and exchange of information; or for economists and political
scientists to Ineasurc the efficacy with which actors apply available resources.
Without consulting the constituents of the social phenomenon of interest,
almost anything goes.
3. Theorizing creates the very unsocial conditions in which theories can survive) if only by inscribing its monologism into its observational data. At moments of contact between theorist and theorized, social research greatly
depends on collaboration and dialogue. Human subjects are used in scientific experiments only on the basis of informed consent. Yet, after signing
the consent form, their ability to understand the nature of their involvement
and to say "no" to practices they might consider unconscionable is rarely
ever called upon again, does not enter the data, and has therefore little
chance to inform a theOlY that speaks to these subjects' capabilities. To
uphold the notion that theory is responsive to observations only, the dialogical nature of the actual contact must be hidden; the very collaboration
needed to conclude an experiment, concealed.
Or consider interviewing. In this aSYlnmetrical interaction, the interviewer
asks questions and the interviewee is expected to answer them. Interviewees
are allowed to speak only within the narrow confines of what is relevant. In
effect, interviewees are being used to support the point that researchers intend to make, and in the course of this exploitation, the inbuilt asymmetrical
power relations are necessarily and irretrievably inscribed in the data on
which theories are constructed.
The deception of informants with regard to the purpose of their participation in a research project, the expectation of answers to questions that are
irrelevant to an interviewees' life, and the contrived stimulus conditions to
which subjects are asked to respond affirm the essential asymmetry, artificiality, and unsocial character of the experimental conditions that spawn the
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data for social and psychological theories. It is these power relations that
creep into the data-generating process in evident violation of the idea of
theory as observer-independent. In fact, theorizing subjects its subjects. It
renders them serviceable (Sampson, 1993) to theories that end up demonstrating little more than holV well theorists have managed to disable the social
nature of human beings. TIUC, submitting to authorities and following instnlCtions arc part of what we can do. But replicating these less than desirable human conditions at the expense of human agency, for the sake of
theorizing, amounts to political suicide for the sodal sciences.
4. Theorizing nurtu1'CS a culture of blindness to the political nature oftheory-for theorist and theorized alike. The social sciences are concerned with
the ways human beings can live together (see Chapters 4, 5, and 8): Sociology, with how people organize themselves into larger wholes and coordinate their actions in ways that sustain these wholes (see Chapter 7);
Political Science, with how people create publics (see Chapters 6, 9, and
10), arrive at consensus on agendas (see the Introduction), and mandate
their leaders to form govermnents (Chapter 11); International Relations,
with how peoples perceive each other across national boundaries (see Chapter 2), seek to resolve international conflicts and regulate the myriad of
interactions (see Chapter 3) between diverse constituencies of nation-states;
Communication Research, with how people construct, sustain, and transform their social realities by communicating with each other. But none of
d,ese social phenomena can be understood by straightjacketing people into
mechanistic preconceptions or by taking away from them the spaces in which
they interact: with one another. The celebration of theol)" the use of ocular
llletaphors for IGIOwing, the reliance on extensional logic for understanding,
and the naturalness with which people accept confinements during datalnaking processes, all have become part of a culture that suppresses the
awareness of the political nature of theories-not only for theorists but also
for aU those who see each other in these terms. The culture of theorizing
malces it difficult for the social sciences to reflect on its social nature.
But this self-defeating consequence of theorizing is not recognizable from
within a representational notion of language-the one notion, which philosophers-Wittgenstein, Austin, Searle, Baldltill, and Rorty among themhave systematically challenged in preference to less abstract and dialogical
conceptions. Critiques here center largely on the fact that words are actions,
too, and that langnaging accomplishes things beyond describing actions.
Reentry adds a cybernetic spin to these critiques, showing that langnaging
is recursive. Where language informs action, theories are likely to become
self-validating. Under these conditions, generalizations of others, whether
published in scientific journals or disseminated in the mass media, provide
fertile ground for social prejudices to arise and to become truths that easily
can subordinate, discipline, marginalize, and criminalize others for their otherness.
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It is always possible to contest and reject a claim. But in view of the
authority that scientific theories conjure in modern culture, contesting them
would go against a whole complex array of deep-rooted cultural beliefs.
Among them is the conviction that theories have but one legitimate interpretation and that theories are shaped by observations, not by theorists. The
latter belief leaves no real target for challenges; tbe former makes political
considerations seem irrelevant.
Whenever scientific accounts concern specific populations-be they the
homeless, the followers of a particular religion, or women, homosexuals,
Mra-Americans, teachers, consumers, Arabs-they can achieve two things:
in the immediate, they can entice "us" to treat "them" in the categories
these accounts employ. In the long rUll, this treatment can transform
"them" into the neatly homogeneous groups which we clailn "they" are.
Self-validation or reification is typical in tbe social sciences. As Giddens
(1984) observed, has not the mere metaphorical use of tbe term market in
nineteenth-century academic writings about economic activities ended up
materializing that reality in ways that, today, neither CEOs nor economists
would dare to question? Has not our conception of "the public" shifted
from what was discussed in salons and side street cafes to what scholars first
theorized as public opinion, then encouraged pollsters to measure? And has
not the use of hydraulic and archeological metaphors in Freud's writing of
tbe human psyche produced a whole industry of psychotberapists and tbeir
clients for all of whom mental disorders have become as real as they can be?
Have not the theories of consumer behavior and of mass media consumption, so avidly embraced by advertising agencies, brought forth the very
consumerism that these theories needed in order to survive by creating the
passive audiences that theories of Inass communication are so good at describing? Do not correlations reported between intelligence, ethnicity, and
crime, when supported by genetic explanations, inform our educational policies and hiring practices that keep such correlations real-well beyond published data? And do not statistics of cultural, racial, sexual, and national
population characteristics inform and reify the very distinctions that statisticians build into their survey instruments and then naively "discover?" Is
it then not likely that theories, which cannot but describe human nature in
mechanistic terms, create the cultural dupes needed in order for television
culture to work, abet the very behaviors necessary for certain institutions to
persist, discourage some people from contesting scientific theories about
them, and create obedient citizens who might well differ in whom they vote
for, but not in how or how much they could be influenced in one way or
another?
This is tbe reality we face. I am not suggesting that tbe project of tbe
social sciences is doomed. Rather, what I submit here is that, in the sense
and to the extent that theorizing does continue to dominate our understanding of otber human beings, it unwittingly also installs an intellectual
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imperialism in our sodal world that silences the voices of the theorized,
prevent..;; us frOlll engaging in meaningful conversations with those who constitute the social phenomena that We wish to understand, and risks depriving
us of the only source for understanding how social phenomena come to be.
lt is in this awareness that we can learn profitably to redefine our fears and
foes, to remodel our security, to redirect our future, and to safeguard the
individual and societal well-being and dignity of the generations yet to be
born, in an increasiugly crowded world.
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